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WILL BEQUESTS ATTENUATE THE PREDICTED MELTDOWN
IN STOCK PRICES WHEN BABY BOOMERS RETIRE?
Andrew B. Abel*
Abstract—General equilibrium models that predict a reduction in asset
prices when baby boomers retire typically assume that people consume all
of their wealth before they die. However, many people hold substantial
wealth when they die. I develop a rational expectations, general equilibrium model with a bequest motive. In this model, a baby boom increases
stock prices, and stock prices are rationally anticipated to fall when the
baby boomers retire, even though consumers continue to hold assets
throughout retirement. The continued high demand for assets by retired
baby boomers does not attenuate the fall in the price of capital.

I.

Introduction

T

HE phenomenal increase in stock prices in the United
States during the past several years has many potential
explanations. One popular explanation is that, as baby
boomers save for retirement, their aggregate demand for
capital is very large, which drives up the price of capital.
This explanation then goes on to predict that, when the baby
boomers retire, they will sell large amounts of capital and
drive down its price. Jim Poterba (2001) uses the term “asset
market meltdown hypothesis” to refer to this predicted
decline in stock prices.
Poterba examines data on asset holdings in several cross
sections of the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) and
raises an important challenge to the asset market meltdown
hypothesis. He points out that recent theoretical models of a
market meltdown assume that baby boomers will sell all of
their assets during their retirement years,1 and he argues that
this assumption is inconsistent with the data on asset holdings in the SCF. Subject to the difficulty of disentangling
time effects, cohort effects, and age effects, Poterba concludes from his tables 1 and 2 that, although consumers
rapidly accumulate assets while they are of working age,
they decumulate assets during retirement much less rapidly
than would be predicted by a simple life cycle model with
no bequest motive and no lifetime uncertainty. He extrapolates from these results to conclude that the baby boomers
will not sell all of their assets during retirement, and he
further concludes that the asset market meltdown hypothesis
is incorrect in its prediction that the price of capital will fall.
Poterba also looks for empirical evidence of an effect of
demographic variables on asset prices and returns. He finds
a very weak effect of demographic variables on asset reReceived for publication June 12, 2001. Revision accepted for publication June 12, 2001.
* The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania and National
Bureau of Economic Research.
This paper was prepared as a discussion of “Demographic Structure and
Asset Returns,” presented by James Poterba as the Review of Economics
and Statistics Lecture, Cambridge, MA, March 20, 2000.
I thank Bill Dupor, Yoel Lax, Nick Souleles, and Amir Yaron for helpful
discussion.
1 Abel (2000) and Brooks (1999) both assume that consumers know
precisely when they will die and do not have bequest motives so that they
optimally choose to have zero wealth at the time of death.

turns, but he finds a more substantial effect of demographic
variables on stock prices using data he generates on “projected asset demands.” Poterba calculates projected asset
demands by combining age-specific asset holdings from his
table 2 with actual and projected age-specific populations in
each year. He finds (table 13) some evidence of a positive
relationship between projected asset demands and the pricedividend ratio over various historical sample periods dating
back to 1926. Looking forward, the projected asset demands
reported in his table 5 increase over the next two decades
and then remain fairly constant for the succeeding three
decades. Because projected asset demands do not fall when
the baby boomers retire, Poterba rejects the asset market
meltdown hypothesis while maintaining the notion that the
baby boom contributed to the increase in stock prices.
Poterba has demonstrated that, in contrast to the predictions of a life cycle model with no bequest motive and no
lifetime uncertainty, the projected demand for assets will not
decline sharply when the baby boomers are retired. I will
accept this conclusion, but I will argue here that the failure
of the demand for capital to fall in the future does not imply
that the price of capital will not fall. Specifically, taking
account of the supply of capital as well as its demand, the
equilibrium price of capital may fall when baby boomers
retire, even if the demand for capital by retired baby
boomers remains high.
In this paper, I present a general equilibrium, overlapping-generations model with convex adjustment costs,
which generate an endogenous price of capital as in Abel
(2000). I include a bequest motive so that consumers will
choose not to consume all of their wealth during retirement.
The inclusion of a bequest motive provides a framework for
addressing the extent to which the predicted meltdown in
asset prices is attenuated by taking account of the fact that
consumers do not consume all of their wealth during retirement. The equilibrium of the model has the following
properties: (i) the price of capital rises when a large cohort
of consumers—baby boomers—is young and working,
which is consistent with Poterba’s tables 5 and 13; (ii) the
price of capital is anticipated to fall when baby boomers
retire; (iii) young baby boomers optimally choose to hold
capital even with the anticipation that its price will fall; (iv)
consumers do not completely decumulate their assets during
retirement, consistent with Poterba’s tables 1 and 2; and yet
(v) the dynamic behavior of the equilibrium price of capital
is unaffected by the strength of the bequest motive, so that
assets held by old consumers for the purpose of making
bequests do not attenuate the predicted drop in the price of
capital when baby boomers retire.
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I develop and analyze the formal overlapping generations
model in section III. Before presenting this formal model, I
present in section II Poterba’s heuristic model and augment
it to include the supply of capital as well as the demand for
capital. The discussion in section II provides an intuitive
preview of the formal results in section III.
II.

A Heuristic Model

Poterba presents a simple stylized, or heuristic, model to
illustrate the effects of demographic variables on the price
of capital. I will begin by presenting this model, with
slightly modified notation.
Consider a closed economy with overlapping generations
of consumers who live for two periods. All consumers who
are born in the same period are identical. Let N t be the
number of consumers born at the beginning of period t.
They inelastically supply one unit of labor when they are
young, and they do not work when they are old, so the
amount of labor employed in period t is N t . Let
 t⫹1 ⬅

N t⫹1
Nt

(1)

be the birth rate in period t ⫹ 1, and assume that the birth
rate is a serially uncorrelated random variable.
To make the analysis transparent, Poterba makes additional simplifying assumptions. He assumes that the capital
stock cannot be augmented by investment and does not
depreciate. Therefore, K t , the aggregate capital stock held at
the beginning of period t, remains constant over time. He
also assumes that, in each period, the wage income of each
young consumer equals one unit of output2 and that young
consumers save a constant fraction s of their wage income.
Therefore, the aggregate saving of the cohort of young
consumers born at the beginning of period t is N t s. All of
this saving is used to purchase K t⫹1 , the aggregate capital
stock to be carried into period t ⫹ 1, at a price of q t per unit
of capital in period t. Therefore,
q t K t⫹1 ⫽ N t s,

(2)

which is equivalent to Poterba’s equation (1).
Equation (2) can be interpreted as the demand for capital,
K t⫹1 , at the end of period t as a function of the price of
capital, q t , given N t and s. If the capital stock remains
constant, as in Poterba’s stylized model, then the price of
capital can be determined directly from this demand curve.
In particular, the price of capital, q t , is proportional to N t ,
the number of workers in the economy. Thus, an increase in
N t will increase the price of capital, q t , as the large cohort
of workers bids up the price of the fixed capital stock.
2 The aggregate production function implicitly underlying this model is
Y t ⫽ N t ⫹ f(K t ), where Y t is aggregate output. With this specification of
the production function, the marginal product of labor always equals one,
regardless of the level of the capital stock.

Poterba goes on to claim that, when the large cohort of
workers retires and sells its capital, it will drive down the
price of capital. This claim is based on the implicit assumption that a baby boom in period t, which generates a large
cohort of workers, N t , will be followed by a decrease in the
size of the working population in the following generation.
That is, Poterba assumes that N t⫹1 is smaller than N t .
Equivalently, he assumes that, if the birth rate in period t,
 t , is large, then the birth rate in the following period,  t⫹1 ,
must not only be small, it must be less than one.3 This
assumption requires strong negative serial correlation in the
birth rate across successive generations.4 However, if the
economy has a fluctuating birth rate that always exceeds
one, so that the population of workers always grows over
time, then, in the stylized model introduced by Poterba and
represented by equation (2), the price of capital increases in
every period.
In the presence of a growing population, the price of
capital in equation (2) can be prevented from growing in
every period by allowing the capital stock to grow over
time. To preview the rational expectations, general equilibrium model that I present in section III, suppose that the
aggregate supply curve of capital slopes upward so that the
Kt⫹1
, is an increas(gross) growth rate of the capital stock,
Kt
ing function of the price of capital. In particular, suppose
that
K t⫹1 ⫽ K t q t ,

(3)

where  ⬎ 0 and  ⬎ 0.5 Equation (3) represents the supply
of capital, K t⫹1 , at the end of period t as a function of the
price of capital, q t , for a given value of K t .
To determine the equilibrium price of capital, I will solve
the demand and supply curves in equations (2) and (3)
simultaneously. First, divide both sides of equation (3) by
N t⫹1 , and use the definition of the birth rate,  t⫹1 , in
equation (1) to obtain
k t⫹1 ⫽ k t

1
q ,
 t⫹1 t

(4)

where k t ⬅ K t /N t is the capital-labor ratio in period t. To
express the capital-labor ratio k t as a function of q t , use
equation (3) to substitute for K t⫹1 in equation (2), and use
the definition of k t to obtain
kt ⫽

1 ⫺共1⫹兲
sq
.
 t

(5)

3 A birth rate equal to one in the model corresponds to one child per
person, which is equivalent to two children per woman.
4 In contrast, if the birth rate is i.i.d. across successive generations, an
increase in N t , which increases q t , is no more likely to be followed by a
decrease in the number of workers or in the price of capital in the
following period than at any other time.
5 If  were equal to zero and if  were equal to one, the capital stock
would be constant over time, as in Poterba’s model.
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FIGURE 1.—SUPPLY

To obtain an expression for the dynamic behavior of the
price of capital, q t , substitute equation (5) into equation (4)
to obtain
ln qt ⫽

1
1
1
ln qt⫺1 ⫺
ln  ⫹
ln t .
1⫹
1⫹
1⫹

AND

DEMAND

FOR
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(6)

Because  ⬎ 0, if the birth rate, ln  t , is serially
uncorrelated with unconditional mean E(ln ), then ln q t
follows a stationary AR(1) process with unconditional mean
1
共E兵ln 其 ⫺ ln 兲. Thus, starting from the unconditional

mean price of capital, an increase in the birth rate  t causes
an increase in the price of capital q t . Consistent with the
asset market meltdown hypothesis, the price of capital, ln
q t⫹1 , is anticipated to fall toward its unconditional mean in
the following period.
In the heuristic model presented here, as well as in the
general equilibrium models in Abel (2000) and Brooks
(1999), consumers spend all of their resources in the final
period of life, contrary to the empirical findings reported by
Poterba in his tables 1 and 2. Poterba argues that, because
consumers continue to hold assets throughout old age, the
aggregate demand for capital does not fall when the baby
boomers age, and, hence, contrary to the asset market
meltdown hypothesis, the price of capital will not plunge
when the baby boomers are retired. I was intrigued by
Poterba’s argument that the meltdown would be attenuated
by the fact that people hold substantial assets until death,
and I set out to examine the extent of this attenuation in the
context of a rational expectations, general equilibrium
model that I present in section III. To address this issue, I
assume that consumers have bequest motives, and thus hold
assets at the time of death. In the specification I use in
section III, the equilibrium dynamics of the price of capital
are completely unaffected by the presence of a bequest
motive and the consequent holding of assets at the time of
death. Therefore, a bequest motive does not attenuate the
predicted decline in stock prices when the baby boom
retires.
Before proceeding to the general equilibrium model, I
will use the analysis in the current section to illustrate the
invariance of the price of capital to the strength of the
bequest motive. Figure 1 illustrates the demand and supply
curves for capital, K t⫹1 , in period t as a function of the price
of capital, q t . The solid downward-sloping curve, K D1 , is the
demand for capital in equation (2) in the absence of a
bequest motive. The solid upward-sloping curve, K S1 , is the
supply of capital in equation (3) in the absence of a bequest
motive. Thus, in the absence of a bequest motive, equilibrium in the market for capital in period t is represented by
point E.
Now consider an otherwise-identical economy with a
bequest motive. The amount of saving, and hence the
demand for capital, in period t will be higher in the economy with a bequest motive than in the economy without a

bequest motive. Thus, the demand for capital in an economy
with a bequest motive is represented by K D2 , which is to the
right of K D1 . 6 If the supply curve of capital were invariant to
the strength of the bequest motive (which is implicitly
assumed by Poterba), the equilibrium in the economy with
a bequest motive would be represented by point G, where
the price of capital is higher than in the absence of a bequest
motive. However, an economy with a bequest motive will
have a higher capital stock in each period than an otherwiseidentical economy without a bequest motive. Therefore, in
period t, the capital stock, K t , is higher in the presence of a
bequest motive than in its absence, and, hence, the supply
curve of capital in the economy with a bequest motive, K S2 ,
is to the right of the supply curve in the absence of a bequest
motive, K S1 . The equilibrium in the economy with a bequest
motive is represented by point F, where K D2 and K S2 intersect, with a higher capital stock, but the same price of
capital, as at point E. In the parametric rational expectations, general equilibrium model in section III, I show that
the equilibrium price of capital, q t , is invariant to the
strength of the bequest motive, which means that rightward
shifts of the supply and demand curves in figure 1 are of the
same size. Because the equilibrium price of capital is not
affected by the strength of the bequest motive, the asset
market meltdown is not attenuated by the introduction of a
bequest motive.
III.

A General Equilibrium Model with a Baby Boom
and an Endogenous Price of Capital

In this section, I present a rational expectations, general
equilibrium model in which the wage income of workers is
determined endogenously, and the asset demands of young
6 The economy with a bequest motive can be viewed as having a higher
value of saving per worker, s, than does the economy without a bequest
motive.
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and old consumers maximize expected lifetime utility. This
model is a simplified version of the model in Abel (2000),
except that it includes a bequest motive so that consumers
will not completely decumulate their assets in old age.
As in section II, consider a closed economy with overlapping generations of consumers who live for two periods.
At the beginning of period t, N t identical consumers are
born, and they each inelastically supply one unit of labor in
period t and earn wage income w t , which I will derive after
introducing the production technologies below. These consumers do not work in period t ⫹ 1 when they are old.

The value, in terms of consumption goods in period t, of the
capital stock carried into period t ⫹ 1 equals the product of
q t from equation (9) and K t⫹1 from equation (8), which is
q t K t⫹1 ⫽

1
I.
 t

Factor markets are perfectly competitive so that each
factor of production earns its marginal product. Thus, using
equation (7), the wage rate in period t, w t , is
w t ⫽ 共1 ⫺ ␣兲

A. Production Technologies

There are two production technologies. One technology,
which I will call the consumption goods technology, produces output that can be either consumed or used as an input
to the other technology, which is the capital adjustment
technology.
The consumption goods technology uses capital and labor
to produce output. Let K t be the aggregate capital stock at
the beginning of period t, let Y t be the aggregate output of
the consumption goods technology in period t, and assume
that
Y t ⫽ AK t␣ N t1⫺␣ , where 0 ⬍ ␣ ⬍ 1 and A ⬎ 0.

(7)

The capital adjustment technology uses output from the
consumption goods technology together with capital to
produce capital for use in the following period. Suppose that
the capital adjustment technology is

t

K t⫹1 ⫽ aI K

1⫺
t

,

(8)

where a ⬎ 0, 0 ⬍  ⬍ 1, and investment, I t , is the
aggregate quantity of output from the consumption goods
technology used in the capital adjustment technology. Because the curvature parameter  is strictly between zero and
one, the capital stock in period t ⫹ 1 is an increasing and
concave function of investment, I t . The concavity of this
function captures the convex costs of adjustment.
The price of capital at the end of period t, q t , is the
amount of consumption goods in period t that must be used
to produce an additional unit of capital for use in period t ⫹
Kt⫹1 ⫺1
, which can be calculated using
1. Thus, qt ⫽
It
equation (8) to obtain7

冉 冊

qt ⫽

冉冊

1 It
a K t

1⫺

.

(9)

Kt⫹1
⫽ a1共1⫺兲 共qt 兲共1⫺兲 , which
Kt

implies that, in equation (3),  ⫽
and  ⫽ a 1(1⫺)  (1⫺) .
1⫺
7

(10)

Yt
.
Nt

(11)

Because capital is used in both the consumption goods
technology and the capital adjustment technology, capital
earns rentals in both technologies. The rental earned by a
unit of capital in the consumption goods technology in
Yt
period t is ␣ . The rental earned by a unit of capital in the
Kt
capital adjustment technology in period t is the marginal
Kt⫹1
, multiplied by
product of capital in that technology,
Kt
the current price of next period’s capital, q t . This rental can
be calculated using equations (8) and (9) to obtain
1 ⫺  It
. Therefore, the total rental to capital is
 Kt
t ⫽ ␣

Yt 1 ⫺  It
⫹
.
Kt
 Kt

(12)

The (gross) rate of return on capital held from period t ⫺ 1
to period t, R t , equals the rental on capital,  t , divided by
the price paid for the capital in period t ⫺ 1, q t⫺1 .
Therefore,
1⫺
It

.
q t⫺1 K t

␣Y t ⫹
Rt ⫽

(13)

B. Consumer Behavior

A consumer born at the beginning of period t chooses
consumption when young, c t , consumption when old, x t⫹1 ,
and a bequest, b t⫹2 , to be divided equally among the
consumer’s  t⫹1 children at the beginning of period t ⫹ 2
when the consumer’s children are beginning the second
period of life. Each consumer born at the beginning of
bt⫹1
at the beginning of period
period t receives a bequest
t
t ⫹ 1. Thus, the present value of the lifetime resources of
a consumer born at the beginning of period t is

Equations (8) and (9) imply that

t ⬅ wt ⫹

1 b t⫹1
.
R t⫹1  t

(14)
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The lifetime budget constraint of a consumer born at the
beginning of period t is
1
1
1
x t⫹1 ⫹
b ⫽  t.
ct ⫹
R t⫹1
R t⫹1 R t⫹2 t⫹2

(15)

A consumer born at the beginning of period t has the utility
function
U t ⫽ ln ct ⫹ ␤Et 兵ln xt⫹1 其 ⫹ ␥Et 兵ln bt⫹2 其,

(16)

where 0 ⬍ ␤ ⱕ 1, ␥ ⱖ 0, and E t { } denotes the expectation
conditional on information available in period t. The consumer chooses c t , x t⫹1 , and b t⫹2 to maximize the utility
function in equation (16) subject to the budget constraint in
equation (15). It can be shown that the optimal value of
consumption when young is8
ct ⫽

1
.
1⫹␤⫹␥ t

 t⫹1

冉

冊

K t⫹1
1
1⫺
I t⫹1 .
⫽
␣Y t⫹1 ⫹
Nt
Nt


(18)

The owners of this capital (who were born at the beginning
of period t) are in the final period of their lives in period t ⫹
1, and they choose consumption, x t⫹1 , and a bequest, b t⫹2 ,
to maximize ␤ ln x t⫹1 ⫹ ␥E t⫹1 {ln b t⫹2 } subject to xt⫹1
1⫺
␣Yt⫹1 ⫹
I
1
 t⫹1
⫹
bt⫹2 ⫽
. The optimal values of
Rt⫹2
Nt
x t⫹1 and b t⫹2 are
x t⫹1 ⫽

冉

and

冉

1
␤
1⫺
I t⫹1
␣Y t⫹1 ⫹
␤ ⫹ ␥ Nt


冊

(20)

Decreasing the time subscript by one unit in equation (20)
implies that a consumer born at the beginning of period t
receives a bequest with present value (as of the beginning of
period t) equal to

冉

冊

1
␥
1⫺
1 b t⫹1
It .
⫽
␣Y t ⫹
R t⫹1  t
␤ ⫹ ␥ Nt


(21)

The present value of lifetime resources of a consumer
born at the beginning of period t can be calculated by
substituting the wage from equation (11) and bequest received from equation (21) into equation (14) to obtain

冉

冊

1
Yt
␥
1⫺
It .
⫹
␣Y t ⫹
Nt ␤ ⫹ ␥ Nt


 t ⫽ 共1 ⫺ ␣兲

(22)

C. Aggregate Behavior

Let ⍜ t ⬅ N t  t denote the aggregate present value of
lifetime resources of the cohort born at the beginning of
period t. Equation (22) implies that

冉

⍜ t ⬅ N t t ⫽ 1 ⫺
⫹

冊

␤
␣ Yt
␤⫹␥

␥ 1⫺
I t.
␤⫹␥ 

(23)

Let C t ⬅ N t c t be the aggregate consumption in period t of
the cohort of young consumers. Equations (17) and (23)
imply that
Ct ⫽

1
1⫹␤⫹␥
⫹

(19)

Define  t⫹1 ⬅ ( t ⫺ c t ) R t⫹1 and V t⫹1 ( t⫹1 ) ⬅ maxx t⫹1,b t⫹2␤ ln
bt⫹2
x t⫹1 ⫹ ␥E t⫹1 {ln b t⫹2 } subject to xt⫹1 ⫹
⫽ t⫹1 . The optimal
Rt⫹2
␤
␥
values of xt⫹1 and bt⫹2 are xt⫹1 ⫽
 and bt⫹2 ⫽
 R .
␤ ⫹ ␥ t⫹1
␤ ⫹ ␥ t⫹1 t⫹2
␤
␥
Therefore, Vt⫹1(t⫹1) ⫽ (␤ ⫹ ␥) ln t⫹1 ⫹ ␤ ln
⫹ ␥ ln
⫹ ␥Et⫹1
␤⫹␥
␤⫹␥
兵ln Rt⫹2其. The optimal value of ct maximizes ln ct ⫹ Et{Vt⫹1(t⫹1)} which is
the value of ct that maximizes ln ct ⫹ (␤ ⫹ ␥) Et{ln t⫹1}, or equivalently, the
value of ct that maximizes ln ct ⫹ (␤ ⫹ ␥) ln (t ⫺ ct). The first-order
1
␤⫹␥
condition for this maximization is ⫽
, which implies that (1 ⫹ ␤ ⫹
ct
t ⫺ ct
␥)ct ⫽ t.

冊

1
b t⫹2
␥
1⫺
I t⫹1 .
⫽
␣Y t⫹1 ⫹
R t⫹2 ␤ ⫹ ␥ N t


(17)

At the beginning of period t ⫹ 1, all of the capital in the
economy, K t⫹1 , is held by the N t consumers who were born
at the beginning of period t. They acquired some of this
capital by saving when they were young, and they inherited
the remaining portion of their capital. The rental accruing to
the aggregate capital held by these consumers is  t⫹1 K t⫹1 ,
where  t⫹1 is the rental to capital in equation (12). Therefore, each owner of capital has resources equal to
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冋冉

1⫺

冊

␤
␣ Yt
␤⫹␥

册

␥ 1⫺
It .
␤⫹␥ 

(24)

8

Let X t ⬅ N t⫺1 x t be the aggregate consumption in period t of
the cohort of N t⫺1 old consumers (who were born at the
beginning of period t ⫺ 1). Equation (19) implies that
Xt ⫽

冉

冊

␤
1⫺
It .
␣Y t ⫹
␤⫹␥


(25)

The aggregate consumption of all consumers in period t is
calculated by adding C t from equation (24) to X t from
equation (25) to obtain
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Ct ⫹ Xt ⫽

冋

D. The Dynamic Behavior of Aggregates

1
共1 ⫹ ␣␤兲Y t
1⫹␤⫹␥
⫹ 共1 ⫹ ␤兲

册

1⫺
It .


(26)

Recall that Y t is the aggregate output of the consumption
goods technology in period t, and I t is the amount of this
output used as an input to the capital adjustment technology
rather than consumed. Thus,
I t ⫽ Y t ⫺ C t ⫺ X t.

(27)

Now substitute aggregate consumption from equation (26)
into equation (27) to obtain9
I t ⫽ Y t ,

(28)

where
0⬍⬅

共1 ⫺ ␣兲␤ ⫹ ␥
⬍ 1.
1 ⫹ ␤ ⫹ ␥

(29)



⫽ 共1 ⫺ 兲
⬎ 0.
␥
1 ⫹ ␤ ⫹ ␥

(30)

Equation (30) implies that comparing two economies
with identical technologies, and preferences that are identical except for the value of ␥, the economy with a stronger
bequest motive (higher ␥) will have a higher investmentoutput ratio, .
9 Equations (28) and (29) may be derived alternatively as follows. The
cohort of consumers born at the beginning of period t owns the entire
capital stock, K t⫹1 , at the beginning of period t ⫹ 1. It acquires capital by
saving (1 ⫺ ␣)Y t ⫺ C t , and (see equation (21)) it inherits capital that has
1⫺
␥
␣Yt ⫹
a present value at the end of period t equal to
I .
␤⫹␥
 t
Therefore, the value at the end of period t of the capital stock carried into
␥
1⫺
period t ⫹ 1 is qt Kt⫹1 ⫽ (1 ⫺ ␣)Yt ⫺ Ct ⫹
␣Yt ⫹
I .
␤⫹␥
 t
1
Now use equation (10) to substitute It for qtKt⫹1, and use equation (24) for

1
1
␤
␥
C t to obtain I t ⫽ (1 ⫺ ␣)Yt ⫺
␣ Yt ⫹
1⫺

1⫹␤⫹␥
␤⫹␥
␤⫹␥
1⫺
␥
1⫺
I ⫹
I . Simplifying this equation yields It ⫽
␣Yt ⫹
 t
␤⫹␥
 t
共1 ⫺ ␣兲␤ ⫹ ␥

Y.
1 ⫹ ␤ ⫹ ␥ t

冉

冊
冊

冉

冉

冊

It
⫽ Ak t␣⫺1 .
Kt

(31)

Kt
. Now divide both sides of the capital adjustNt
ment technology in equation (8) by N t , and use the expression for the investment-capital ratio in equation (31) to
obtain
where kt ⬅

k t⫹1  t⫹1 ⫽ a  A  k t1⫺共1⫺␣兲 .

(32)

Take logarithms of both sides of equation (32) to obtain an
AR(1) process for ln k t⫹1

The investment-output ratio  depends on the strength of
the bequest motive ␥. In the special case in which ␥ ⫽ 0, the
␤
共1 ⫺ ␣兲 as in the
investment-output ratio is  ⫽ 
1⫹␤
laissez-faire special case in Abel (2000, section 5). To
determine the effect of ␥ on , differentiate the expression
for  in equation (29) with respect to ␥ to obtain

册

It
, is an important factor
Kt
affecting the growth rate of the capital stock as well as the
price of capital. Use equation (7) to substitute for Y t in
equation (28) and divide both sides by K t to obtain
The investment-capital ratio,

冋冉

冊

ln kt⫹1 ⫽ 关1 ⫺ 共1 ⫺ ␣兲兴 ln kt ⫹ ln a
⫹  ln  ⫹  ln A ⫺ ln t⫹1 .

(33)

Because 0 ⬍ ␣ ⬍ 1 and 0 ⬍  ⬍ 1, ln k t⫹1 follows a
stationary AR(1) process if the birth rate, ln  t⫹1 , is serially
uncorrelated. To analyze the impact of a bequest motive on
the accumulation of capital, recall from equation (30) that
the investment-output ratio, , is an increasing function of
the bequest motive parameter ␥. Equation (33) implies that
an increase in ␥, which increases , will increase the
average value of the capital-labor ratio but will not affect the
variance or serial correlation of ln k t⫹1 . More precisely, an
increase in ␥ increases the mean of the stationary distribution of ln k t⫹1 but has no effect on any autocovariances of
ln k t⫹1 .
The equilibrium value of the (logarithm of the) price of
capital is determined by substituting equation (31) into
equation (9) and taking logarithms of both sides of the
equation to obtain
ln qt ⫽ ⫺ln a ⫹ 共1 ⫺ 兲 ln 
⫹ 共1 ⫺ 兲 ln A ⫺ 共1 ⫺ ␣兲共1 ⫺ 兲 ln kt .

(34)

Use equation (34) lagged one period to obtain an expression
for ln q t⫺1 . Then subtract [1 ⫺ (1 ⫺ ␣)] ln q t⫺1 from ln
q t , and use equation (33) to obtain
ln qt ⫽ 关1 ⫺ 共1 ⫺ ␣兲兴 ln qt⫺1
⫺ 共1 ⫺ ␣兲共 ln  ⫹ ln a兲

(35)

⫹ 共1 ⫺ ␣兲共1 ⫺ 兲 ln t .
If the birth rate,  t , is serially uncorrelated, then the
(logarithm of the) equilibrium price of capital, ln q t , follows
a stationary AR(1) process, with the same serial correlation
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as ln k t⫹1 , and this AR(1) process is independent of the
strength of the bequest motive ␥. Suppose that in period t ⫺
1 the price of capital equals its unconditional mean, and that
the realization of the birth rate,  t , is unusually large.
According to equation (35), this baby boom in period t
causes the price of capital, q t , to increase. If the birth rate is
serially uncorrelated, the price of capital is rationally anticipated to fall back toward its unconditional mean in period
t ⫹ 1. The magnitude of the anticipated drop in the price of
capital—or asset market meltdown—when the baby
boomers retire in period t ⫹ 1 is independent of the strength
of the bequest motive. Therefore, the introduction of a
bequest motive does not attenuate the asset market meltdown.
IV.

Concluding Remarks

Poterba’s examination of age-specific asset holdings in
the Survey of Consumer Finances leads him to conclude
that consumers accumulate assets while they are of working
age, but that they hold on to these assets during retirement
much more than would be predicted by a simple life cycle
model without lifetime uncertainty and without a bequest
motive. He uses age-specific asset holdings, together with
age-specific population data and projections, to calculate a
time series of projected asset demand. He finds evidence
that the price-dividend ratio of stocks in the United States
has been positively related to his projected asset demand
variable in various historical sample periods. Looking into
the future, Poterba’s projected asset demand variable increases over the next twenty years, and then remains fairly
constant. Because the projected asset demand does not
decline when the baby boomers retire, Poterba rejects the
asset market meltdown hypothesis, which predicts a decline
in stock prices when the baby boomers retire.
I have taken at face value Poterba’s finding about agespecific asset holdings and his finding of a positive effect of
his projected asset demand on stock prices in historical data.
I have also taken at face value his finding that projected
asset demand will not fall when the baby boomers retire.
However, to understand the behavior of the price of capital,
it is important to take account of the supply of capital as
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well as the demand for capital. To analyze the interaction of
the supply and demand for capital, I have developed a
rational expectations, general equilibrium model with a
bequest motive. This model is consistent with Poterba’s
observations that retired consumers continue to hold a
substantial amount of assets at the time of death and that a
baby boom can drive up the price of capital. However,
contrary to Poterba’s conclusion, there is an anticipated
decline in the price of capital when baby boomers retire, and
this decline is not attenuated by the introduction of a
bequest motive.
My finding that the equilibrium price of capital is invariant to the bequest motive is a consequence of the particular
parametric specification of preferences and technology that
I use. I regard this invariance result as a rhetorical device to
make the point that one cannot predict the price of capital by
focusing on the demand for capital while ignoring its
supply. The effect of asset demands by retirees on asset
prices in a more general context remains an open question
worthy of further study. In considering the role of asset
demands by retirees in a more general framework, different
motives for these asset demands might be analyzed. Instead
of using the bequest motive specified in this paper, positive
asset demands by retirees can be generated by a bequest
motive based on altruism. Alternatively, precautionary saving to guard against longevity risk in the absence of perfect
annuity markets would be a way to generate a demand for
assets by retired consumers. Another direction for exploration is to examine alternative forms of the aggregate supply
curve of capital, especially because this paper has illustrated
the potentially important role of the supply of capital in
determining the equilibrium price of capital.
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